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This paper makes three contributions. First we present a technique by which the monetary 
transmission mechanism of Germany, France, the UK and the Eurozone can be decomposed 
into its component cycles, compared across economies and across time. As a result, we found 
that the individual data generating processes have varied over time. Second we show that 
Germany has now converged on the rest of Europe and not vice versa, although Germany had 
dominated monetary policy making in Europe for many years. Third, we show that the UK as 
an outsider has behaved like a peripheral EMU country, even when EMU was not in place. In 
other words, the transmission mechanisms of Germany and the UK were fundamentally 
different. Hence, when that German monetary policy dominated Europe in a way that was not 
in line with the rest of Europe, never mind the UK, it is no surprise that the UK eventually left 
the ERM (1992). The current financial crisis may enforce the trend of convergence of the 
transmission mechanism. But there have been signs of a divergence between core and 
periphery, to some extent involving the UK, so this general convergence, as opposed to 
tighter convergence in the core, may not last. 
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1. Introduction  
In this paper we analyse the transmission mechanisms for monetary policy in the 
European Union and Eurozone, from short term interest rates to their impact on annual 
growth rates. Specifically, we examine the transmission mechanisms for a common monetary 
policy in Germany, France, and the Eurozone as a whole, for signs of structural convergence 
over the past thirty years; and compare those to the transmission mechanism of an outsider, 
the UK, who did not join the single currency but who was subject to many of the same 
economic events and pressures on monetary policy. Several authors1 have pointed out that a 
successful currency union (and a common monetary policy) requires symmetric structures, as 
well as shocks, across the union so that even common shocks provoke similar responses and 
have similar effects in the different member states. Monetary transmissions are therefore the 
prime example of where structural convergence is needed since monetary policy changes are 
the crucial case of a common shock that we need to have a common impact across the union. 
Without that the single monetary policy cannot be expected to work smoothly or represent an 
improvement over separate policies/currencies. Testing for convergence in monetary trans-
missions is therefore a genuine test of integration, provided it is not part of a general tendency 
seen also among outsiders and in the rest of the world.  
In general, the monetary transmission mechanism describes how policy-induced 
changes in the nominal money stock or the short-term nominal interest rate impact on real 
variables such as aggregate output and employment. Specific channels of monetary trans-
mission operate through the effects that monetary policy has on interest rates, exchange rates, 
equity and real estate prices, bank lending, and firm balance sheets: see (Ireland and Boston, 
2005). Recent research on the transmission mechanism seeks to understand how these 
channels work in the context of dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium models (e.g Barran 
et al., 1995; Boivin and Giannoni, 2006; Fukuda, 1993; Golinelli and Rovelli, 2005; Goodhart 
and Hofmann, 2005; Kim and Korea, 2003; Lutkepohl and Wolters, 2003).  
 
 
1 BIS (1995), Dale and Haldane (1995), Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998), Hughes Hallett and Piscitelli (1999; 
2002). Asymmetries in monetary transmissions can arise from variations in house ownership and household debt 
or mortgages (MacLennan et al., 2000); from variations in the financing of firms and hence the industrial 
structures in different economies (Kashyup and Stein, 1997; Carlino and DeFina, 1999); or from variations in the 
size of firms (industrial concentration), financial structures and the legal system (Cecchetti, 1999) – in short, 
from both the borrowing and the lending side of monetary transactions. Indeed, MacLennan et al (2000) argue 
that such “indirect” impacts of monetary asymmetries are likely to prove more difficult for policy to absorb that 
a lack of synchronisation in business cycles. 
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However, in this paper we take a different tack. We focus on a statistical analysis of 
the link between the short term interest rates and the annual growth rate of an economy in a 
model free environment. In that way we avoid biasing our results, and avoid making them 
dependent on a specific model for which there may be less than consensus support. We 
particularly ask, what are the effects of monetary policy on the growth rate and are these 
effects similar across selected Eurozone (EMU) countries? Is monetary policy able to smooth 
the business cycle; or does it cause greater uncertainty?  
For this purpose we investigate the transmission mechanism for Germany, France and 
the Eurozone, with the UK as the outside comparator. So far, empirical results suggest that the 
transmission mechanisms for those countries are different in each country (e. g. Dedola and 
Lippi, 2005; Kim and Korea, 2003; Lovrinovic et al., 2004; Peersman and Ghent, 2004; 
Schmidt, 2006). For the Eurozone countries these differences could be crucial for monetary 
policy effectiveness since the same interest rate can have different output effects in different 
places, making the use of a common monetary policy more difficult. Therefore it is important 
to test not only whether the transmission mechanisms are different, but in what sense they are 
different. The next question is whether these differences still persist under the Euro, or 
whether we can observe some sort of convergence within the Eurozone. However, in this 
paper we only focus on Germany and France, therefore our results are quite limited in terms 
of the Eurozone. But within the Eurozone, Germany and France represent a good 60% of total 
output, so it matters more whether the transmission mechanism of these countries are similar 
(or are becoming more similar) than it does for other countries. 
In order to test for convergence of the transmission mechanism, we need to employ a 
time-varying approach. We cannot use a method which assumes a parameter structure which 
is constant over time, since that would exclude convergence in terms of changes in the under-
lying parameters of the transmission mechanisms. We therefore test for convergence using a 
time-frequency approach already well used in economics (Hughes Hallett and Richter (2002; 
2004; 2006a; 2006b) and which is standard in the engineering literature (Boashash, 2003) But 
for the purpose of our analysis we only focus on the link between two variables. That is, we 
concentrate on the impact effects of monetary policy on the growth rate. As a proxy for 
monetary policy we use the market 3-month interest rate. However, and in contrast to Richter 
(2007), we test the impact of the interest change on the annual growth rate and not on the 
quarterly growth rate. The quarterly growth rate is the change from one quarter to another, 
whilst the annual growth rate measures the change from today to a year ago. Hence, the 
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annual growth rate captures more long-term effects. As we will see, the results are 
significantly different to Richter (2007). 
This paper is organised as follows: the following section gives a brief introduction into 
the time-frequency approach. Section three then presenting the empirical results, and section 
four draws the conclusions to be learned from the exercise. 
 
2. A Technical Introduction to Time Frequency Analysis  
Spectral analysis decomposes the variance of a sample of data across different 
frequencies. The power spectrum itself then shows the relative importance of the different 
cycles in creating movements in that data, and hence describes the cyclical properties of a 
particular time series. It is assumed that the fluctuations of the underlying data are produced 
by a large number of elementary cycles of different frequencies. Furthermore, it is usually 
assumed that the contribution of each cycle is constant throughout the sample. However, as 
Chauvet and Potter (2001) show for the US, business cycles cannot be assumed to be 
constant. Hence, the spectrum cannot be constant over time due to changing weights 
associated with each of the elementary cycles. A “traditional” frequency analysis cannot 
handle that case. But in recent years time frequency techniques have been developed which 
can do so. It depends on using a Wigner-Ville distribution for the weights (see for example: 
Matz and Hlawatsch, 2003).  
In this paper we use a special case of the Wigner-Ville distribution, namely the “short 
time Fourier transform” (STFT). The STFT catches structural changes (here interpreted as 
changes of the underlying lag structure in accordance with Wells, 1996), but assumes local 
stationarity. We employ the STFT for two reasons: first, the time series we analyse are 
already in log-differenced form so stationarity may be assumed. Moreover, standard unit root 
tests performed on our data (specifically the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests, available on 
request) confirm that assumption. Finally, results available in the literature using similar data 
(Campbell and Mankiw, 1987; Clark, 1987; Todd, 2003; Watson, 1986) also confirm that 
conclusion. Secondly, if the time series is stationary, then the STFT and the Wigner-Ville 
distribution actually coincide (Boashash, 2003). Therefore, employing the Wigner-Ville 
distribution directly would not have changed our results.  
All the data collected for our sample are real GDP, seasonally adjusted. Annualised 
growth rates are defined as: 
 ( )( )4 tt t
t 4
Yy log Y log
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 (2.1) 
In order to get time varying parameters into our framework, equation (2.2) below, we 
use the Kalman filter; and to do that we need to make initial parameter estimates to start the 
Kalman filter estimation. These initial parameter values are obtained by OLS estimation using 
the entire sample (see also Wells, 1996)2. Given these start values, we can then re-estimate 
the model parameters using the Kalman filter. We then employ a general to specific approach, 
eliminating insignificant lags using the sequential strategy specified below. The maximum 
number of lags was determined by the Akaike Criterion (AIC), and was found to be eight in 
one case and less in the others. Each time we ran a new regression we used a new set of initial 
parameter values. Then, for each regression we applied a set of diagnostic tests shown in the 
tables in Appendix 2, to confirm that the specification found was valid. The final parameter 
values are therefore filtered estimates, independent of their start values.  
Suppose, we are interested in the relationship between two variables:{ }ty , say the UK 
growth rate, and { }tx  the UK interest rate. We assume that they are related in the following 
way:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )2t t t tt tV L y A L x u ,  u i.i.d. 0,= + ∼ σ  (2.2) 
where A(L)t and V(L)t are filters, and L is the lag operator such that Lyt = yt-1. Notice that the 
lag structure, A(L)t, is time-varying. That means we need to use a state space model (such as 
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 (2.3) 
Tests for parameter variation: We test for the random walk property using the 
LaMotte-McWother (1978) test. For structural breaks, we employ the fluctuations test 
(Ploberger et al., 1989). Finally, we then use our general to specific approach to estimate 
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2 Obviously, using the entire sample implies that we neglect possible structural breaks. The initial estimates may 
be biased therefore. The Kalman filter will then correct for this since, as Wells (1996) points out, the Kalman 
filter will converge to the true parameter value independently of the initial value. But choosing initial values 
which are already “close” to the true value accelerates convergence. Hence we employ an OLS estimate to start. 
And the start values have no effect on the parameter estimates by the time we get to 2008. Our results are robust. 
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(2.2); starting off with lag lengths of nine and p=q, and dropping those lags which were never 
significant. 
Sequential testing for significance: In general, using a time-varying model, (2.2)-(2.3), 
implies that we get parameter values for each point in time. Hence, a particular parameter 
could be significant for all points in time; or at some times but not others; or it might never be 
significant. The parameter changes are at the heart of this paper as they imply a change of the 
lag structure and a change in the spectral results. We therefore employed the following testing 
strategy: if a particular lag was never significant then this lag was dropped from the equation 
and the model was estimated again. If the AIC criterion was less than before, then that lag 
was completely excluded. If a parameter was significant for some periods but not others, it 
was kept in the equation with a parameter value of zero for those periods in which it was 
insignificant. This strategy minimised the AIC criterion, and leads to a parsimonious 
specification. Finally, before accepting the regression results found, we tested the residuals in 
each case for auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity.  
Parameter and temporal stability tests: Specification (2.2)-(2.3) was then validated 
using two different stability tests. Both tests check for the same null hypothesis against 
differing temporal instabilities. The first is the fluctuations test of Ploberger et al. (1989), 
which detects discrete breaks at any point in time in the coefficients of a (possibly dynamic) 
regression. The second test is due to LaMotte and McWorther (1978), and is designed 
specifically to detect random parameter variation of a specific unit root form (our 
specification). We found that the random walk hypothesis for the parameters was justified for 
each country (results available on request). Finally, we chose the fluctuations test for 
detecting structural breaks because the Kalman filter allows structural breaks at any point and 
the fluctuations test is able to accommodate this.3 Thus, and in contrast to other tests, the 
fluctuations test is not restricted to any pre-specified number of breaks.4 
Conversion to the frequency domain (spectral analysis): Once this regression is done, 
it gives us a time-varying ADL model. From this ADL model we can calculate the short–time 
 
3 Notice that all our tests of significance, and significant differences in parameters, are being conducted in the 
time domain, before transferring to the frequency domain, because no statistical tests exist for calculated spectra 
(the transformations being nonlinear and involving complex arithmetic). Stability tests are important here 
because our spectra are sensitive to changes in the underlying parameters (see section 3). 
4 The fluctuations test works as follows: one parameter value is taken as the reference value, e.g. the last value of 
the sample. All other observations are now tested whether they significantly differ from that value. In order to do 
so, Ploberger et al. (1989) have provided critical values that we have used. If the test value is above the critical 
value then we have a structural break, i.e. the parameter value differs significantly from the reference value. 
Fourier transform, as originally proposed by Gabor (1946), in order to determine the time-
varying spectrum and co-spectrum. We briefly introduce the STFT in Appendix 1 to show 
how this is done: for details, the reader is referred to Boashash (2003). The basic idea is to 
find the spectrum of a signal x(t), at time t, by analysing a small portion of the signal around 
that time period. These calculations can then be repeated for each time period in turn. 
Structural convergence: Hence, by transferring the time domain results into the 
frequency domain, we can show how the relationship between two varaibles has changed in 
terms of individual frequencies. That allows us to investigate whether any convergence took 
place over time in terms of either outcomes or policy responses; and, if so, at which 
frequencies. As a measure of the similarity in policy responses, as opposed to increasing 
convergence in business cycles which would be represented by the coherence between two 
sets of output data, we use the gain.5 To see if there has been convergence in the monetary 
transmissions, we can compare these gains across countries. 
Thus, having obtained estimates for the coefficients in (2.2), we need to calculate the 
gain from the cross-spectrum between { }ty  and { }tx .The gain is the frequency domain 
equivalent of a regression coefficient in the time domain. It changes an incoming signal to the 
outgoing signal. For the purpose of this paper therefore, it reflects the transmission 
mechanism: i.e. the strength with which the interest rate signal is transferred into the business 
cycle.  
Calculating the gains: Hughes Hallett and Richter (2002; 2003a; 2003b; 2004) show 
that the time-varying cross spectrum (fYX(ω)t) using the STFT is then equal to 
 ( ) ( )YX t XXtf T( ) f tω = ω ω  (2.4) 
where T(ω)t is the transfer function obtained from the short time Fourier transforms of the 
weights { }j ja ∞=−∞ and{ } . From here we can calculate the gains. As noted in Appendix 1, 
the traditional formulae can be used to do this at each point in time. The last term in (2.4), 
fXX(ω)t, is the spectrum of the predetermined variable. This spectrum may be time varying as 
well. We can now calculate the gain (we are only interested in the gain in this paper) from 
i i
v ∞=−∞
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5 This is not a complete picture of the transmission mechanism of course, but it does represent a necessary 
condition for convergence. Had we also been interested in similarities in the incidence or timing of the impacts 
of monetary policy changes, then we would have to compare phase shifts across countries too. 
 , for b=1…q and i=1…p (2.5) 
q p
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where j = √-1. The gain is then given by A(ω)t = 2tT( ) .ω  
Two comments: Our method allows us to overcome a major difficulty in this kind of 
analysis: namely that a very large number of observations would usually be necessary to carry 
out the necessary frequency analysis by direct estimation. This would be a particular problem 
in the case of structural breaks, since the sub-samples would typically be too small to allow 
the associated spectra to be estimated directly.  
Second, in the following section we present the estimated time-varying gains 
dependent on the results of our fluctuations tests. One can see from these figures that the 
gains change. However, one cannot infer from those figures alone that the changes in the 
underlying spectra and co-spectra are statistically significant. The figures for the gains have to 
be accompanied by the fluctuation test results. Once a structural break has been identified by 
the fluctuations test, the results of that will show up as significant in the associated spectrum.  
3 Empirical Results  
 In this section and the next, we study the gain between Euro-zone interest rates and 
output growth in 4 countries: namely in the Germany, France, the aggregated Euro-zone, and 
the UK. We focus on the Euro-zone comparison to represent the smaller Euro economies; and 
more importantly because that is the aggregate the common monetary is intended to manage. 
We include the UK as a natural outside comparator; an economy that chose not to join the 
common monetary policy but which is sufficiently close to be subject to many of the same 
shocks and external pressures. The UK can reasonably be taken to represent what might have 
happened to the Euro-zone economies had they not joined the Euro. It is important to have an 
external comparator such as this in order to be sure that any convergence effects that we pick 
up in the Euro-zone economies are genuine Euro-zone effects, and not a general phenomenon 
affecting all countries world-wide or Europe-wide. So the UK acts as the control group here 
To make our estimates, we use quarterly, seasonally adjusted data for real GDP in all 
four economies, as published in the OECD Main Economic Indicators, and log difference 
them once to obtain growth rates. The resulting series were fitted to an ADL model as 
described above, and tested for stationarity, statistical significance and a battery of 
specification checks. The interest rates are 3 month T-bill rates for all countries. All the data 





The database for Germany starts in 1977Q1 and finishes in 2007Q2. Figure 1 shows 
the gain between the growth rate and the Euro interest rate.  
 
- Figure 1 about here - 
 
The gain went through very significant changes over time. Towards the end of the 
sample, the gain is characterised by two cycles: firstly, a cycle at a frequency of 2.5, or 2.5 
quarters; and a second one at a frequency of 1.1 or 1.72 quarters. However, these cycles only 
emerged permanently after the start of the monetary union in 1999; there was no anticipation 
of the effects of the change in the German economy. Before EMU, these same cycles had 
emerged temporarily at periods of particular stress in the ERM regime in 1984 and 1991. 
Indeed these periods of effective independence from the thrust of European monetary policies, 
German leadership in the hard-EMS regime (1985-1990), and in the aftermath of German 
reunification (1992-1999), are particularly clear. That said, it is interesting to note that 
European monetary policies do not lead to a large degree of uncertainty for the annual growth 
rate as the importance of the high frequencies (noise) is very low. This result is in contrast to 
the quarterly growth rate (see: Richter, 2007). Hence the choice of the annual or quarterly 
growth rate matters. 
Importantly, the introduction of the Euro in 1999 has clearly changed the monetary 
transmission mechanism. The key question now is, is this change in line with the transmission 
mechanisms of France and the Euro-zone as a whole?  
Last but not least, from table 1 we can see that the interest rate is able to explain about 
98% of the variance of the growth rate. Indeed the diagnostics show a strong and stable 
relationship underlies these gain calculations. As the residuals are not autocorrelated, we can 
also describe our results as robust.  
- Table 1 about here - 
 
3.2 France 
The French data sample starts in 1972Q1 and finishes in 2008Q1. Figure 2 shows the 
gain between the French growth rate and the Euro interest rate.  
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- Figure 2 about here - 
 
In contrast to the German gain, the French gain is almost always characterised by the 
same two cycles which emerged in Germany after the introduction of the Euro. This suggests 
that France was always the follower to European monetary policies in the way that Germany 
now is to the ECB. There was a short period during the breakdown of the EMS in 1990-1994 
when the relationship between Euro interest rates and French growth collapsed and vanished; 
also during the imposition of the hard EMS peg in 1985-87.  Otherwise the French gain, or 
dependence on European interest rates has remained constant, if weaker than in the early days 
of the EMS and not as strong as the German dependence now is.  
Hence, the transmission mechanisms of Germany and France have converged in the 
sense that Germany has now accepted the same kind of transmission mechanism that France 
has always had. That is, Europe-wide interest rates now have the same type of effect in 
Germany as they do in France. However, the impact of any changes in Euro interest rates on 
Germany is now twice as strong as they are in France. In that sense Germany is now far more 
sensitive to, and more dependent on, changes in the direction or force of European monetary 
policy than France. This may have significant implications in terms of producing differences 
in economic performance in the two economies. Convergence is therefore not complete, and 
differences of opinion over the appropriate stance of policy are likely to remain.  
Thus, in contrast to Germany, the policy gains in France did not change with the 
introduction of the Euro. They had been in operation at least since the mid 1990s, and in the 
hard EMS period. It is remarkable too that whenever there was a shock and the shape of the 
gain disappeared, it re-appeared quite rapidly – typically after two or three years in this 
analysis. That was not the case in Germany. 
Finally from the time domain regressions (table 2) we can see that the interest rate 
explains about 99% of the variance of the growth rate, and there is no autocorrelation. The 
diagnostics again show our results to be stable, significant and robust. 
- Table 2 about here – 
3.3 European Monetary Union 
In this section we analyse how the EMU as whole behaves in response to monetary 
shocks. The EMU data contains France and Germany, but also all the other EMU countries 
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apart from Slovenia and Malta6. The calculations in this section are not designed to show how 
far convergence has gone in terms of the policy responses in individual economies; but to 
show whether the rest of the Eurozone, beyond France and Germany, reacts to policy changes 
in the same way as France and Germany do. For data, we used the aggregated, seasonally 
adjusted real GDP of all EMU members to obtain a Euro-area growth rate. However, the 
approach has to be slightly different for interest rates since there is no common 3-month T-
bill rate for the Euro area. Hence, for interest rates, we use GDP weighted averages of the 3-
month T-bill rates in the Eurozone. This is obviously an artificial rate. But it has been 
developed and used by the OECD as a suitable measure of the common market rates of 
interest, and the data for it have been taken from the OECD’s Economic Outlook. The time 
series starts in 1970Q1 and ends in 2008Q1. Given the results of the two previous sections, 
the question we want to ask in this section is whether EMU has followed the German model 
or the French model more closely for setting monetary policy, and how effective the current 
monetary transmission mechanism has been for the Euro economy as a whole.  
Figure 3 shows the gains for EMU as a region in response to Euro interest rates. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Euro-zone has followed the French model of monetary policy. 
The same two cycles (at frequencies of 1.1 and 2.5) dominate, although with a slightly 
stronger impact effect of 0.5 instead of 0.35 as in France. It is tempting to think that this 
might be the influence of the stronger impacts of monetary policy in Germany. But those 
higher impacts in Germany (at 0.6) appear only after 2001. So this is a genuine “rest of EMU” 
effect; indeed the impact in the rest of EMU must have been considerably stronger than in 
France until 2000 since the gains in Germany in that period were close to zero. But since then 
the transmission effects have remained broadly constant with the coming of EMU, despite the 
stronger German component, which means that there has been a good deal of convergence 
within the rest of the Eurozone and it is more towards the French transmission mechanism 
than the German one. So even in the years of the currency snake where France followed 
German monetary policy, the transmission mechanism elsewhere was characterised more by 
the French channel rather than the German channel. That seems to be surprising at first 
glance, but may actually be the reason why in the currency snake and the EMS exchange rates 
had to be adjusted several times. It also shows that during this period, the long term effects of 
monetary policy were different for at least two countries (if not a majority). So for many of 
the ERM countries, participation in the hard EMS may have been suboptimal for growth. That 
 
6 Malta and Slovenia were omitted in order to avoid another structural break.  
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only changed with the introduction of the Euro, when Germany lost control and had to adjust 
to the rest of Europe. 
- Figure 3 about here -  
A look at the time domain results (table 3) reveals that the lag structure of the EMU is 
indeed closer (although not identical) to France than to Germany. However, the regression 
results also show that Euro-zone growth rates are determined by other factors beyond interest 
rates. In fact the Euro-zone rates explain only 40% of the growth rate. The other diagnostics 
imply a stable relationship. The explanation for no autocorrelation of the residuals is that the 
time variation of the intercept term serves as an unobserved component in this regression. So 
it catches systematic exogenous shocks to the system. 
- Table 3 about here – 
There is one qualification to add to this story. The gains in the transmission of 
monetary policies in the Euro-zone have started to fall away since 2005, while they have 
remained the same or strengthened in Germany (and France). If this is sustained beyond 2008, 
it will mean that the Euro-zone has started to diverge again in terms of monetary responses – 
in this case divergence between core and periphery, rather than between each country pair. 
 
3.4 The UK 
Given the results gained so far, we now widen our scope and analyse a country outside 
EMU. The UK is an interesting case because it did not participate in the exchange rate 
mechanism, nor has it joined the Euro, but it clearly plays a very large role in the European 
financial markets. Indeed, London has become the most important financial centre in Europe. 
So how does the UK transmission mechanism behave? Is it, or has it become broadly similar 
to those in the rest of Euro-zone? We know from Richter (2007) that short term interest rate 
effects in the UK and France are similar. Does that also hold for Germany, and in annual 
growth rates too? Last, but most important, comparisons with the UK as outside comparator 
will show whether the degree of convergence that we have uncovered in this paper is a feature 
specific to Europe and her single currency, or whether it is a general phenomenon shared by 
other economies at a similar level of development (a globalisation phenomenon). 
For the UK, the sample starts in 1966Q1 and finishes in 2008Q1. Figure 4 shows the 
gains between UK growth rates and short term interest rates.  
- Figure 4 about here - 
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The answer is that superficially the UK transmission mechanism looks to be similar to 
that in the Euro-zone and in France (the difference here is mainly in the greater stability in the 
UK, vs. the instability of the French transmissions in the collapse of the EMS in the early 90s 
and mid 1980s). The UK gains are also characterised by two cycles, at similar strength to the 
Euro-zone but stronger than in France (at least from the start of the EMS regime onwards). 
However these two cycles are at frequencies of 1.3 and 2.6. They increased in power in 1980, 
the start of the EMS, held constant till 1996; but then declined in power steadily, but not fast, 
at least until the end of 2007. At that point they still dominated, but at a strength similar to the 
Euro-zone and France (but less than Germany). And the decline, though longer and slower 
than that in the Euro-zone as a whole, probably parallels the divergence we have noted in the 
periphery economies of the Euro-zone. Hence the transmission mechanism in the UK seems 
to be close to that of EMU as a whole, but not to Germany or perhaps France. It is therefore 
no surprise that the UK, as the dominant financial market place, left ERM in 1992. If the 
arrangement was already suboptimal for most EMU countries, it clearly was suboptimal for 
the UK, so much so that the UK was better off leaving the system. 
However, this situation may not continue to hold. To the extent that the UK remains in 
line with EMU as a whole, and given that Germany has now converged to EMU, participation 
in the Euro by the UK might now be easier than it was before. Yet the UK does not share in 
the sudden weakening of transmissions in the Euro-zone after 2005; nor in their strengthening 
in Germany, nor the instability in France. So if the UK has been part of a divergence club in 
the past few years, it has not seen the same divergence as elsewhere. Indeed, looking at the 
UK’s lag structure in table 4, one can see that it is different to the lag structure in the Euro-
zone. The reason why a different lag structure has led to similar outcomes (until 2005) is that 
the additional UK lags are much smaller in weight, about one half, than the lags which are 
important for EMU. That is happenstance, and may change in this time-varying world. And if 
it does change then the monetary transmission channels for the UK may become completely 
different again to those in the Euro-zone.  
- Table 4 about here – 
To summarise, there has been something of a globalisation effect in the convergence 
of the monetary transmissions in Europe. The UK may have had rather different monetary 
transmissions in the instability period of the early 1990s, and was perhaps well advised to 
leave the ERM at that point. But she had a period of similar transmissions to the Euro-zone 
until 2005, and to a lesser extent France (but not Germany). After 2005, she may have 
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participated in the general divergence in the periphery economies from the core. Yet there are 
now signs that her participation in even that divergence is temporary and could easily fade. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 This paper has made three contributions. First we have presented a technique by which 
the transmission mechanism can be decomposed into its component cycles and compared 
across economies; and we have shown how that can be done such that the transmission 
mechanisms, and the relative importance of their cycles, can vary over time. As a result, we 
found that the individual data generating processes have varied over time.  
 Second we have shown how to apply these methods to answer the question: are trans-
mission mechanisms different and if so, are they converging? The interesting result is here 
that Germany has now converged on the rest of Europe and not vice versa, although Germany 
had dominated monetary policy making in Europe for many years. The good news is that this 
should have a stabilising effect on the European monetary policy. The bad news is that the 
other countries stayed for political reasons in an exchange rate mechanism which was sub-
optimal for them. The reasons that made it suboptimal for them are now reappearing without 
the same compelling political reasons to keep focussed on convergence. The single currency 
will keep them in, but that does not keep their political responses in line. 
The UK as an outsider has behaved like a peripheral EMU country, even when EMU 
was not in place. But when that German monetary policy dominated Europe in a way that was 
not in line with the rest of Europe, never mind the UK, it is no surprise that the UK eventually 
left the ERM. However, things have changed since then and for a time monetary policy has 
had similar long term effects in UK and in the rest of Europe. The current financial crisis may 
enforce this trend. But there have been signs of a divergence between core and periphery, to 
some extent involving the UK, so this general convergence, as opposed to tighter convergence 
in the core, may not last. 
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Appendix 1: Short Time Fourier Transform  
 
Consider a signal s(τ) and a real, even window w(τ), whose Fourier transforms are S(f) 
and W(f) respectively. To obtain a localised spectrum s(τ) at time tτ = , we multiply the 
signal by the window w(τ) centred at time tτ = . We obtain 
 ( ) ( ) ( )ts t, s τ−τ = τ ww  (A.1) 
We then calculate the Fourier transform w.r.t. τ which yields 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }s f tF t, f sτ→ τ−= τw wF  (A.2) 
(sF t, fw )  is the STFT. It transforms the signal into the frequency domain across time. It is 
therefore a function of both. Using a bilinear kernel and a Gabor transform (the time series is 
stationary, but may contain parameter changes), Boashash and Reilly (1992) show that the 
STFT can always be expressed as a time-varying discrete fast-Fourier transform calculated for 
each point in time. That has the convenient property that the “traditional” formulae for the 
coherence or the gain are still valid, but have to be recalculated at each point in time. The time 












+ α − ω∑ i
 (A.3) 
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where ω is angular frequency and j is a complex number and α are the estimated coefficients. 
The main advantage of this method is that, at any point in time, a power spectrum can be 
calculated instantaneously from the updated parameters of the model (see also Lin, 1997). 
Similarly, the power spectrum for any particular time interval can be calculated by averaging 
the filter parameters over that interval.   
 
Appendix 2: Statistical Results 
Note: For reasons of space, the results quoted in the tables describe the final regression done and its 
























































































VAR/System - Estimation by Kalman Filter 
Dependent Variable DLGERGDP Quarterly Data From 1977:01 To 
2007:02 
Usable Observations 122 Std Error of 
Dependent Variable 
7.344034908 
R2 0.98837 Standard Error of 
Estimate 
4.953864717 
Mean of Dependent 
Variable 
-0.037649496 Sum of Squared 
Residuals 
2871.2707493 
Akaike (AIC) Criterion  0.68802 Ljung-Box Test: 
Q*(21)  
33.0404 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat 
Constant     0.92915083 0.069017425053 13.46255430988  
DLGERGDP{1}    -0.83350102 0.862330010393 -0.966568496268   
GERINT  -0.51877805 0.180640176422 -2.87188631575  
GERINT{1}  0.12575100 0.037446995505 3.358106480903  















































































Figure 2: Gain between Euro Interest Rates and the French Growth Rate 
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VAR/System - Estimation by Kalman Filter 
Dependent Variable DLFRGDP Quarterly Data From 1972:01 To 
2008:01 
Usable Observations 144 Std Error of 
Dependent Variable 
1.8633178724 
R2 0.99882 Standard Error of 
Estimate 
5.7263454851 
Mean of Dependent 
Variable 
0.0083842572 Sum of Squared 
Residuals 
4623.5355987 
Akaike (AIC) Criterion  0.70189 Ljung-Box Test: 
Q*(26)  
35.7327 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat 
Constant     0.14457851  0.030366950564 4.7610481630  
DLFRGDP{2} 3.03444661 2.248747036208 1.349394378080   
FRINT  0.18960241 0.012935754672 14.65723611884 
FRINT{1} -0.217076786 0.072575370699 -2.99105302958 






















































































Figure 3: Gain between EMU Growth Rate and Euro Interest Rates 
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VAR/System - Estimation by Kalman Filter 
Dependent Variable DLEMUGDP Quarterly Data From 1970:01 To 
2008:01 
Usable Observations 145 Std Error of 
Dependent Variable 
1.8916279266 
R2 0.40258 Standard Error of 
Estimate 
2.6225880721 
Mean of Dependent 
Variable 
0.0023331688 Sum of Squared 
Residuals 
962.91554742 
Akaike (AIC) Criterion  0.01512 Ljung-Box Test: 
Q*(24)  
22.6655 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat 
Constant     -0.09454859  0.038465000620  -2.45804203950 
DLEMUGDP{3}    -0.76789776 2.549985465622 -0.301138094484 
EMUINT  0.12742306 0.076250929192 1.671101732675 
EMUINT{1}  -0.26594720 0.035038487742 -7.59014483447 









































































Figure 4: Gain between the UK Growth Rate and Euro Interest Rates 
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VAR/System - Estimation by Kalman Filter 
Dependent Variable DLUKGDP Quarterly Data From 1966:01 To 
2008:01 
Usable Observations 169 Std Error of 
Dependent Variable 
4.3055685240 
R2 0.98995 Standard Error of 
Estimate 
4.9772938011 
Mean of Dependent 
Variable 
0.0023204919 Sum of Squared 
Residuals 
4038.0729340 
Akaike (AIC) Criterion  0.20073 Ljung-Box Test: 
Q*(26)  
20.2142 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat 
Constant     0.685210687  1.171592652093  0.584854032314  
DLUKGDP{2}    0.817373815 2.650584706442 0.308374907941   
DLUKGDP{8} -0.120035372 0.023446142261 -5.11962142703  
UKINT{2}  0.163644836 0.033876378444 4.830647294398     
UKINT{5}  -0.310839329 0.055562194434 -5.59443938632     
Table 4: Regression Results: the UK Growth Rate and Euro Interest Rates 
 
